GSC Bicameral separates confidential human conversations from controlled human-to-agent commands. It gives teams encrypted messaging for sensitive discussions and a governed approval path for AI-assisted workflows.
Use Bicameral’s human and agent planes only through an approved beta client, preserving the cryptographic and approval boundary between them.
Manual
Version 1.0
Product
GSC Bicameral 0.1.0 foundation
Verified
July 15, 2026
Language
English · Source
Owner
Bicameral security product and support
Source
bicameral · 07aec6c
Review cycle
45 days
Start here
Audience, scope, and prerequisites
Covers security expectations and controlled workflows for Bicameral foundation deployments. The verified repository contains backend and relay services but no reviewable end-user client or completed cryptographic WASM package, so no production confidentiality claim should be inferred from this manual.
Who this is for
Approved beta participants
Human reviewers of agent commands
Bicameral security operators
Before you sign in
An approved beta client and named security owner
Verified participant identity and device trust
A documented agent-command approval policy
A fallback communication channel for security incidents
Access model
Roles and responsibilities
Role
Access
Responsibilities
Human participant
Use the approved human conversation plane when the client and cryptography are enabled.
Verify contacts and safety indicators
Protect device keys
Command requester or approver
Submit or review structured agent-plane requests.
Review scope and effects
Reject ambiguous or over-privileged commands
Security operator
Operate identity, relay, audit, and Gatekeeper services.
Maintain plane separation
Investigate identity and key events
Workspace map
Navigation
Human conversation plane
Approved beta client
Exchange end-to-end encrypted human messages when the implementation is enabled.
Agent command plane
Approved beta client
Create structured human-to-agent requests and approvals.
Contacts and identity
Approved beta client
Verify participant identity, device, and safety state.
Approvals
Approved beta client
Review pending agent actions before execution.
Gatekeeper
Deployment-specific
Review governed mail or calendar actions when the module is enabled.
Chapter 01
Use the human conversation plane
The human plane is intended to keep agent services outside plaintext conversations and key material.
Procedure 1.1
Verify a human contact and device
Confirm identity and cryptographic safety state before exchanging sensitive content.
1
Use an approved client
Do not use an unofficial build or direct relay connection.
2
Open contact identity
Check that the participant is marked HUMAN and matches the expected organizational identity.
3
Verify safety information
Compare the provided device or safety identifier through a separate trusted channel when the client exposes it.
4
Resolve changes
Stop sensitive messaging when a device, key, or identity indicator changes unexpectedly.
Expected result
The participant has a verified human identity and understood device/key state before sensitive messaging begins.
Procedure 1.2
Send a human-plane message
Keep human discussion separate from executable agent instructions.
1
Confirm the plane
Check the visible Sanctuary or human-plane indicator.
2
Confirm recipients
Review every participant and device-state warning.
3
Write minimum-necessary content
Do not include secrets or data prohibited by policy even when encryption is enabled.
4
Send and verify state
Use the client’s delivery and safety indicators; do not infer delivery from relay availability alone.
Expected result
The approved client submits ciphertext for the intended human recipients without treating the text as an agent instruction.
Chapter 02
Request and approve agent actions
An agent-plane request is an executable proposal, not ordinary chat; the human approver remains accountable for scope and outcome.
Procedure 2.1
Create an agent command
State a bounded objective, inputs, allowed systems, and prohibited effects.
1
Switch to the command plane
Confirm the UI identifies the destination as an AGENT or governed workflow.
2
Define the objective
State the desired result, affected records, time range, and success criteria.
3
Limit authority
Specify allowed tools and systems and exclude destructive, external, or sensitive actions unless explicitly approved.
4
Review generated plan
Check identities, destinations, data scope, side effects, and rollback before submission.
5
Submit for approval
Do not bypass or self-approve when separation of duties applies.
Expected result
A structured, bounded request enters the approval queue without accessing human-plane plaintext or keys.
Procedure 2.2
Review an agent approval
Approve only when the exact action, data, authority, and expected effect are understood.
1
Verify requester and agent
Confirm immutable HUMAN and AGENT identities and tenant.
2
Inspect the full proposal
Review tool calls, targets, parameters, data exposure, external messages, and destructive effects.
3
Compare with policy
Check authorization, separation of duties, change window, and evidence requirements.
4
Approve, deny, or return
Deny ambiguous scope; require a revised request rather than editing intent mentally.
5
Review completion evidence
Confirm actual effects and preserve the approval and execution record.
Expected result
Only an explicitly authorized command executes and its approval and outcome remain auditable.
Operating rules
Security and data handling
Keep human conversation and agent command planes visibly and technically separate.
Never give agents human-plane private keys or decrypted conversation content.
Verify human, agent, and device identity before trust.
Require explicit human approval for consequential agent actions.
Stop use on unexpected key, identity, plane, or approval-state changes.
Current release
Known limitations
Read before relying on an unsupported workflow
These limits describe the source-pinned GSC Bicameral 0.1.0 foundation scope and must be rechecked when the product changes.
The verified source is version 0.1.0 foundation; the roadmap places H2H MVP, enhanced messaging, agent orchestration, Gatekeeper, and production audit at later milestones.
No end-user frontend or completed cryptographic client is present in the verified repository.
Backend storage and relay components alone do not provide end-to-end security.
Marketing descriptions of post-quantum messaging must not be treated as implemented certification.
Gatekeeper workflows are deployment-specific and require separate authorization.
Problem solving
Troubleshooting
You cannot sign in to GSC Bicameral
Likely cause: The session expired, the identity is not assigned to the application, or the tenant claim is missing.
Open the application from the approved portal and complete sign-in again.
Confirm that the correct organizational identity and tenant are selected.
If access is still denied, record the time and request an entitlement check from support.
A documented action or navigation item is not visible
Likely cause: The current role, release, tenant configuration, or feature flag does not expose that operation.
Confirm the role and prerequisites listed for the procedure.
Reload the page after signing in again; do not attempt to bypass the interface through direct URLs.
Ask the product owner whether the feature is enabled for the tenant before reporting a defect.
A saved change or background operation is not visible
Likely cause: Validation failed, processing is still running, or the current view is stale or filtered.
Review inline validation, status indicators, filters, and the selected tenant or workspace.
Refresh once and search for the item by its stable name or identifier.
Do not repeat irreversible or externally visible actions until the original operation status is known.
Identity, device, or safety information changes
Likely cause: A legitimate device rotation, client reset, account change, or active impersonation may have occurred.
Stop sensitive communication and agent approvals.
Verify the participant through a separate trusted channel.
Have the security operator review identity and key events before trust is restored.
An agent action is pending or completed unexpectedly
Likely cause: The request was ambiguous, approval state is stale, or a workflow executed outside the expected client state.
Do not approve or resubmit.
Preserve request, approval, agent, and audit identifiers.
Escalate to the security operator and review external side effects.
Escalation
Contact support
Contact support when
A repeatable GSC Bicameral error blocks an approved workflow
Expected data, permissions, or tenant boundaries appear incorrect
A security, privacy, compliance, or data-loss concern is suspected
A key, identity, device, or plane-separation concern occurs
An agent action may have executed without valid approval
The deployment’s cryptographic readiness cannot be demonstrated
Include
The page, action, and expected result
The exact error text and time of occurrence, including time zone
Your tenant, role, browser, and a sanitized record or item identifier
Whether the problem can be reproduced and which troubleshooting steps were tried
Never include
Passwords, access tokens, API keys, recovery codes, or session cookies
Unredacted personal, health, financial, or other regulated data
Private encryption keys or complete confidential documents unless an approved channel is provided